Workflow risk check: Find the GitHub workflow patterns behind tj-actions and Ultralytics

Paste a public GitHub repository. We read its .github/workflows files and flag pull_request_target jobs that run a pull request's code, outsider-controlled text pasted into run: scripts, tokens with more rights than the job needs and actions not pinned to a commit, each with the fix to paste.

What it does

  • Finds pull_request_target and workflow_run jobs that check out the pull request's code (the "pwn request")
  • Finds PR titles, branch names, issue and comment text pasted into run: and github-script
  • Flags workflows with no permissions: block, and write-all tokens
  • Lists actions on a tag or branch and hands them to the Action pin lookup
  • A fix for every finding, plus self-hosted runner and unsecure-commands warnings

What goes in, what comes out

What goes in
A public GitHub repository (owner/repo or its URL), or the link to one workflow file.
What comes out
Each workflow file with its triggers and findings by severity, the job, step and line, and a fix to paste. Unpinned actions go to the Action pin lookup in one click.
Example
actions/checkout on 17 October 2026: 7 workflow files, nothing to fix now, 5 to tighten (missing permissions blocks and actions on version tags).
Limits
Public repositories on github.com, up to 25 workflow files. Reads workflow files only: composite actions (action.yml) and called reusable workflows in other repositories aren't opened. 20 checks a day per IP address without an account. No finding doesn't mean a workflow is safe.

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