osec.one case analysis cover: ArcaneDoor, Cisco firewalls backdoored below the operating system, three times

One state-sponsored group, which Cisco Talos tracks as UAT4356 and Microsoft as STORM-1849, has gone after Cisco's ASA and Firepower firewalls three times. Each time its implant sat a level lower or lasted longer than the time before. In 2024 it was a Lua script that ran at every boot from the firewall's flash disk. In 2025 it was RayInitiator, a bootkit written into the boot ROM of old ASA 5500-X boxes, with a loader that rebooted the firewall when someone tried to take a memory dump. In April 2026 it was FIRESTARTER, which survived reboots and the September 2025 patches on newer Firepower hardware and went away only when someone pulled the power cable.

CISA answered with Emergency Directive ED 25-03 on 25 September 2025 and an update in April 2026. This write-up goes through each campaign, the implants and how they hid, the directive's steps, which models can't be cleaned at all, and what a company with one ASA at the edge should check this week.

Six stages: 2024 Line Dancer, in-memory shellcode that switched off syslog and hooked authentication; 2024 Line Runner, a client_bundle zip on disk0 that runs Lua at boot; 2025 the VPN bugs CVE-2025-20362 and CVE-2025-20333 giving unauthenticated root; 2025 LINE VIPER, which reboots the device on a core dump and lies to the verify command; 2025 RayInitiator, a bootkit in ROMMON on ASA 5500-X without Secure Boot; 2026 FIRESTARTER, which survives reboots and patches but not a power pull
Each round answered the previous round's clean-up advice.

The timeline

text
ArcaneDoor / UAT4356, 2023-2026 (Cisco Talos, Cisco PSIRT, NCSC UK, CISA)

Jul 2023       capability being tested and developed (Talos)
Nov 2023       earliest attacker-controlled infrastructure
Dec 2023-Jan 2024  most of the first campaign's activity
early 2024     a customer reports a suspicious ASA to Cisco
24 Apr 2024    Talos "ArcaneDoor" post; CVE-2024-20353 and -20359 published
               and added to CISA KEV
May 2025       government responders bring Cisco attacks on ASA 5500-X
               with VPN web services enabled
25 Sep 2025    CVE-2025-20333, -20362 (in KEV, federal due date next day)
               and -20363; CISA ED 25-03; Canada's Cyber Centre alert
29 Sep 2025    Shadowserver: >48,800 vulnerable ASA/FTD on the internet
Oct 2025       NCSC UK analysis of RayInitiator and LINE VIPER
5 Nov 2025     Cisco: a new attack variant makes unpatched devices reload
12 Nov 2025    CISA: agencies marked devices "patched" on builds that
               weren't; minimum versions published
23 Apr 2026    Talos: FIRESTARTER; Cisco persistence advisory; ED 25-03
               updated: patch by 24 Apr, unplug the power by 30 Apr
19 May 2026    Cisco's final fixed-release table for the persistence fix

2024: Line Dancer in memory, Line Runner on the disk

Talos never found how the attackers first got in during 2024. It did find two implants:

text
Implant       Where it lived        What it did (Talos, 24 Apr 2024)
Line Dancer   memory only           shellcode sent in an unauthenticated POST to
                                    the VPN's host-scan handler; it could switch
                                    off syslog, run show configuration and CLI
                                    commands, take packet captures, hook
                                    authentication to accept a "magic number",
                                    and hook crash dumps so the box rebooted
                                    instead of writing one. Gone after a reboot.
Line Runner   disk0: (flash)        abused a legacy VPN client preload feature
                                    (CVE-2024-20359): at boot the ASA unzipped a
                                    client_bundle*.zip and ran the Lua inside,
                                    which served the attacker's commands through
                                    a web endpoint; a shutdown hook wrote the zip
                                    back. Survived reboots and upgrades.

CVE-2024-20353 (CVSS 8.6) let the attacker force a reload, which is how Line Runner got started without waiting for a maintenance window. Talos's checks were concrete: show memory region | include lina showing more than one executable (r-xp) region for lina, especially one of exactly 0x1000 bytes, and an unexpected zip on disk0:. Its advice if you suspected a compromise: don't reboot and don't take a core dump yourself.

2025: two VPN bugs, LINE VIPER and a bootkit in ROM

The 2025 campaign started from two bugs in the ASA's VPN web server, chained:

text
CVE              What it is                                 CVSS   CISA KEV
CVE-2025-20362   VPN web server: some URLs that should      6.5    25 Sep 2025
                 need a login don't
CVE-2025-20333   VPN web server buffer overflow: root code  9.9    25 Sep 2025
                 execution with valid VPN credentials
                 (none needed when chained with 20362)
CVE-2025-20363   HTTP server code execution (also IOS,      9.0    not listed
                 IOS XE, IOS XR)

On top came LINE VIPER, a shellcode loader that the UK's NCSC took apart. It ran CLI commands at the highest privilege, captured packets, let the attacker's devices skip authentication, suppressed chosen syslog messages and recorded admins' CLI commands. Its defences were aimed squarely at the 2024 clean-up advice:

1. A core dump triggered an immediate reboot, which wiped the in-memory evidence Talos had told people to collect.
2. copy system:/text triggered a reboot and verify returned the legitimate hash of the running code.
3. It fixed the split lina memory region, so the 2024 show memory region check came back clean on an infected box.
4. It could schedule a reboot 1 to 10 hours out, unless the operator set a flag to stop it.

NCSC analysed it on ASA 9.12(4)67 and 9.14(4)24, which were fully patched at the time. Under it sat RayInitiator, a multi-stage GRUB bootkit that NCSC says was "flashed to" the device and Cisco calls a ROMMON modification. ROMMON is the code that starts before the ASA software. RayInitiator patched the kernel during boot and installed a handler in lina, so it came back after reboots and after a full software upgrade.

Which models can't be cleaned

RayInitiator was seen only on ASA 5500-X models that have no Secure Boot, so nothing checks ROMMON before it runs. Cisco's list, and the dates support ended:

text
Model                         Secure Boot   Last day of support   2025 status
5512-X, 5515-X                no            31 Aug 2022           compromised
5585-X                        no            31 May 2023           compromised
5525-X, 5545-X, 5555-X        no            30 Sep 2025           compromised
5506-X, 5506H-X, 5506W-X,     yes           31 Aug 2026           nothing seen;
5508-X, 5516-X                                                    support ends soon
Firepower / Secure Firewall   Secure Boot + no ROM persistence seen in 2025
                              Trust Anchor  (but see FIRESTARTER, 2026)

Count the days for an owner on 25 September 2025: a 5525-X, 5545-X or 5555-X had 5 days of support left; a 5512-X or 5515-X had been out of support for 1,121 days. A box whose boot ROM may hold an implant, and that gets no more firmware, can't be proven clean. ED 25-03 told agencies to permanently disconnect every model whose support ended on or before 30 September 2025, by that date.

CISA ED 25-03: what agencies had to do

The directive bound US federal agencies, but its steps are the best public checklist for anyone with an ASA:

text
Deadline (EDT)          Step
26 Sep 2025, 23:59      inventory every ASA (hardware, ASA-SM, ASAv); for each
                        public-facing one, run the core dump and hunt steps
                        and upload to CISA's Malware Next Gen
                        compromised: disconnect from the network, don't power
                        off, report to CISA
                        not compromised, model on 31 Aug 2026 support or ASAv:
                        patch, then every later update within 48 hours
30 Sep 2025             permanently disconnect models out of support on or
                        before 30 Sep 2025
2 Oct 2025, 23:59       inventory report to CISA
12 Nov 2025             minimum versions published; all ASA and Firepower
                        devices, not just public-facing ones
24 Apr 2026, 23:59      Firepower / Secure Firewall: core dumps uploaded, patch
                        including the persistence fix
30 Apr 2026             hard reset: unplug the power
1 May 2026              inventory report

The 12 November note is the uncomfortable one: agencies had reported devices as patched while running builds that were still vulnerable, so CISA published minimum versions. In early October Shadowserver still counted over 45,000 vulnerable devices, and around 13 November over 30,000, down from 48,800 on 29 September.

2026: FIRESTARTER and the power cable

On 23 April 2026 Talos described FIRESTARTER, found on a US federal civilian agency's Firepower device after LINE VIPER. It lives inside lina, overwrites a WebVPN XML handler and runs shellcode sent with a magic-byte prefix. To survive, it edits the boot mount list when the device goes through a graceful reboot, so a reload puts it back. It survived upgrades to the September 2025 fixes. A cold power pull, where the device shuts down without the graceful path, removes it, which is why the updated directive ordered agencies to unplug the power by 30 April.

FIRESTARTER affects Firepower 1000/2100/4100/9300 and Secure Firewall 1200/3100/4200, the hardware that has Secure Boot. It does not affect ASA 5500-X, Secure Firewall 200 or 6100, ASAv, ISA3000 or FTDv. Cisco recommends reimaging over the power pull, which can corrupt the disk.

The fixed builds

text
Train      Sep 2025 minimum         Apr/May 2026 persistence fix
ASA 9.12   9.12.4.72 (hidden)       -
ASA 9.14   9.14.4.28 (hidden)       -
ASA 9.16   9.16.4.85                9.16.4.92
ASA 9.17   migrate                  -
ASA 9.18   9.18.4.67                9.18.4.135
ASA 9.19   migrate                  -
ASA 9.20   9.20.4.10                9.20.4.30
ASA 9.22   9.22.2.14                9.22.3.5
ASA 9.23   9.23.1.19                9.23.1.321
ASA 9.24   -                        9.24.1.111
FTD        7.0.8.1, 7.2.10.2, 7.4.2.4, 7.6.2.1, 7.7.10.1 (Sep 2025);
           7.1 and 7.3: migrate

Sources: Cisco event response page and persistence advisory v1.3,
CISA ED 25-03 device update guidance. CISA advises 9.12/9.14 owners
to move to 9.16.4.85 where the hardware allows.

The osec Firmware branch check takes an ASA version and lists each known-exploited Cisco ASA CVE that still applies to it, with the fixed release on the same train.

A company with one ASA: what to check

1. Is the risky part switched on?

1. show version: write down the model and release. If the model is in the no-Secure-Boot rows above, plan the replacement now; checks can't clear it.
2. show running-config webvpn and look for enable <interface> on the outside interface, and show running-config crypto ikev2 | include client-services. Either one means the VPN web server the 2025 bugs live in is reachable.
3. Until you can patch, Cisco's temporary mitigation is removing client-services from IKEv2 or no webvpn. The latter ends all SSL VPN, so plan it with users.

2. Look for the implants

These are the steps from CISA's core dump and hunt instructions and Cisco's detection guide. Run them before any reboot; on a confirmed hit, disconnect the box but leave it powered and call Cisco TAC.

1. show checkheaps, then again five minutes later. The run counter should go up by about one a minute; if it doesn't move, treat it as compromised.
2. more /binary system:/text | grep 55534154 41554156 41575756 488bb3a0. Any output is an indicator of compromise.
3. show kernel process | include lina_cs (2026 check). Any output means FIRESTARTER; rule out a false positive with verify disk0:/asdm.bin.
4. dir disk0: for a client_bundle zip you didn't put there (2024).
5. During the upgrade, watch the console for "Bootloader/ROMMON verification succeeded". A "failed at address" message, or a firmware_update.log on disk0: after moving to 9.12.4.72 or 9.14.4.28, means a TAC case.
6. Don't use tab completion while you run them; CISA warns it may crash the device.

3. Read the logs you kept elsewhere

LINE VIPER suppressed specific syslog IDs, so look for what's missing in a syslog server's copy: 302013/302014 (connection built and torn down) and, if you log at debug, 609002/710005. Then look for what's there: VPN logins from impossible places (716002, 722029-722031), packet captures you didn't start that target TACACS+, RADIUS, LDAP or SMB traffic, and scans from the firewall into the LAN on TCP 443 or LDAP.

4. If anything matched, or the box is a 5500-X without Secure Boot

1. Treat the configuration as untrusted: rebuild it from scratch with configure factory-default (or write erase and reload) or a reimage, not by restoring the old file.
2. Rotate every secret the firewall held: local and enable passwords, VPN pre-shared keys, the LDAP/RADIUS/TACACS+ shared secrets, and every certificate whose private key was on the box.
3. On FIRESTARTER-affected Firepower and Secure Firewall models, patch to the persistence fix, then reimage, or at least cold-boot by pulling the power.
4. On a 5500-X model without Secure Boot, replace the hardware. Cisco has no way to verify its ROM.

Edge-device persistence that outlives the patch is a pattern on this site: FortiGate 2025 kept attackers reading files through a symlink after the fix, and Ivanti Connect Secure 2024 needed a factory reset rather than a patch. ArcaneDoor is the furthest down that line so far: below the operating system, and on the oldest boxes, below anything the owner can check.

Type your ASA version and see which known-exploited Cisco ASA CVEs still apply, with the fixed release on your train. Save it as a watch and get one email when a new one starts applying.

Check your ASA version

Sources: Cisco Talos: ArcaneDoor, new espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices (24 April 2024, updated 25 September 2025); Cisco advisory: CVE-2024-20353 (24 April 2024); Cisco advisory: CVE-2024-20359 (24 April 2024); Cisco advisory: CVE-2025-20333 (25 September 2025, v2.1 6 November 2025); Cisco advisory: CVE-2025-20362; Cisco: Continued Attacks Against Cisco Firewalls (event response); Cisco: Detection guide for continued attacks; Cisco advisory: ASA/FTD persistence, ED 25-03 (23 April 2026, v1.3 19 May 2026); Cisco Talos: UAT-4356 and FIRESTARTER (23 April 2026); NCSC UK: RayInitiator and LINE VIPER malware analysis report (October 2025); CISA: ED 25-03, Identify and Mitigate Potential Compromise of Cisco Devices; CISA: ED 25-03 core dump and hunt instructions; CISA: ED 25-03 guidance for device updates and patching (12 November 2025); CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog; Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: AL25-012; BleepingComputer: nearly 50,000 Cisco firewalls vulnerable (30 September 2025); BleepingComputer: CISA warns feds to fully patch Cisco flaws (13 November 2025).