osec.one case analysis cover: Marks & Spencer 2025, a help-desk reset, DragonForce ransomware and 46 days without online orders

In April 2025 one of the UK's best-known retailers lost its online shop for 46 days. Marks & Spencer's chairman told Parliament that the attackers got in on 17 April 2025 through a "sophisticated impersonation" that involved a third party. The ransomware was DragonForce, and the people behind the intrusion are widely linked to Scattered Spider. M&S has not published a full technical report, so this analysis separates what M&S, Parliament, the National Crime Agency and its own results say from what was only reported.

Attack chain: impersonation on 17 April, two days of access, DragonForce ransomware, shutdown of payments and online orders 22 to 25 April, rebuild with online orders back on 10 June, GBP 131.3 million of incident costs
M&S 2025: from one impersonation to six weeks without online orders.

What is established and what is not

ClaimStatusSource
Entry on 17 April 2025 through impersonation involving a third partyEstablishedChairman Archie Norman, Business and Trade Sub-Committee, 8 July 2025
Attackers detected on 19 April, crisis team that night, public statement 22 AprilEstablishedM&S evidence to Parliament, summarised by Triumcyber
Ransomware was DragonForce, with other "loosely aligned" actorsStated by M&S chairmanEvidence of 8 July 2025, Infosecurity Magazine
The impersonation was a call to the outsourced IT help desk that reset a password or MFAReported, not confirmed by M&SBBC and trade press; TCS says its systems were not the source
Attackers are Scattered SpiderReported, widely believedFour people aged 17 to 20 arrested by the NCA on 10 July 2025 over M&S, Co-op and Harrods; no charges announced in the sources used
Whether a ransom was paidNot disclosedNorman declined to say, citing law enforcement

On the help-desk mechanism, to be plain: M&S said "impersonation" and "third party". The detail that an outsourced service desk reset credentials comes from press reporting, and Tata Consultancy Services, which ran M&S's service desk, has said its own systems and staff accounts were not breached. In late October 2025 the press reported that M&S had moved its service desk to another provider; M&S did not describe that as a finding about the attack.

Step 1: the impersonation (17 April)

Scattered Spider's known method, set out in CISA's advisory AA23-320A and in our MGM and Caesars analysis, is to phone support, pose as an employee and ask for a password or MFA reset. The data they need (name, role, manager, employee number) is mostly public or bought. Against M&S the entry date, 17 April, was a Thursday before the Easter weekend, when staffing is thin and a rushed help-desk agent has the most reason to say yes.

The same pattern appeared at the contractor level in Okta and Lapsus$ 2022: the weak point was a support organisation with real reset powers over somebody else's accounts.

Step 2: two days of quiet access (17 to 19 April)

M&S detected the attackers on 19 April, two days after entry. In those two days a ransomware crew with a valid account does what the MGM crew did: find the identity system, escalate, find the virtualisation layer. M&S has not detailed this. Reported claims that the domain database was copied are not in M&S's evidence and are left out here.

Step 3: shutdown, as the visible damage (22 to 25 April)

DateEvent
17 AprilInitial access through impersonation involving a third party
19 AprilAttackers detected; crisis team convened that night
22 AprilM&S discloses a cyber incident; contactless payments and Click & Collect disrupted in stores
25 AprilAll online orders for clothing, home and beauty paused (UK, Ireland, international)
10 JuneUK online orders resume for some clothing lines: 46 days after the pause (Reuters)
10 JulyNCA arrests four people over the M&S, Co-op and Harrods attacks
August 2025Click & Collect restored, some services still down (The Register, 11 August)
5 November 2025Half-year results: £101.6 million of incident costs booked in the first half
Year to 28 March 2026Full-year: £131.3 million incident costs, £100 million insurance

Stores stayed open with manual workarounds, and food availability suffered because stock allocation was done by hand. M&S said its systems rebuild would take months and that it deliberately disconnected systems, including warehouse management, to contain the attack.

What it cost, in M&S's own numbers

ItemFigureSource
Estimate given in May 2025About £300 million lost operating profit before mitigationM&S, May 2025
Online outage costRoughly £10 million of profit per week (witness summary)Parliament evidence
Incident costs, full year to 28 March 2026£131.3 million, of which £109.3 million systems response and recoveryM&S full-year results
Insurance proceeds£100 millionM&S full-year results
Net incident cost after insurance£31.3 million (our arithmetic: 131.3 - 100)Derived
Half-year sales, fashion, home and beauty-16.4%; UK online -42.9%; stores -3.4%M&S half-year results, 5 Nov 2025
Half-year foodSales +7.8%, profit -58.8% from markdowns and waste during manual allocationThe Register, 5 Nov 2025
Half-year adjusted profit before tax-55.4% to £184.1 million; operating margin 12% to 2.7%M&S half-year results
Full-year adjusted profit before tax-23.8% to £671.4 millionM&S full-year results

Two worked checks. The outage at £10 million a week for 46 days (6.6 weeks) is about £66 million of lost online profit, a fifth of the £300 million headline. And £671.4 million after a 23.8% fall implies roughly £881 million the year before (671.4 / 0.762), a drop of about £210 million. That drop includes more than the attack (the half-year report also shows a packaging levy of over £50 million), so it is an upper bound for the incident, not a measurement of it. The Cyber Monitoring Centre classed M&S and Co-op together as one event with estimated losses of £270 million to £440 million.

How Co-op got off lighter

The Co-op was breached about two weeks later, reportedly by the same actors. Reports say ransomware only succeeded at M&S because Co-op shut systems down before the encryptors could be deployed; Co-op witnesses told Parliament that heavily segmented systems limited the effect. M&S, by contrast, had a hybrid legacy and modern estate with about 50,000 people on its systems across employees, contractors and outsourced teams, which M&S itself said complicates mapping lateral movement and restoring in the right order.

Controls that break each step

StepControlCheck
Impersonation of staff on a help deskReset only after video check against HR photo, callback to a number on file, or manager approval. Same strength as the login it replacesOut-of-band approval per reset, logged
Outsourced desk with broad reset powersGive the contractor no ability to reset privileged accounts or MFA; privileged resets stay with an in-house teamSeparate queue for admin and finance users
Valid account used for two daysAlert on a reset followed by a new MFA device or a sign-in from a new location within minutes; no admin rights from a fresh enrolmentReset-then-enrol alert to the security team, not the help desk
Move to the hypervisorsSeparate admin identities for virtualisation, phishing-resistant MFA, management network off the user networkHypervisor logins from jump hosts only
Encryption and long outageOffline tested backups, a rebuild order for core systems, segmentation so one domain compromise doesn't reach everythingPractise the "turn it off" decision as Co-op did
Manual fallbackTested paper or offline processes for stock allocation and payments (M&S's food profit fell 58.8% in the half under manual allocation)Rehearse the fallback with real volumes

What to take from it

1. Account recovery is authentication. Scattered Spider has used the same help-desk route at MGM, Caesars and, on M&S's own account, an impersonation with a third party. A reset path that accepts LinkedIn facts is the weakest login you have.
2. Outsourcing the desk outsources your reset power. Decide exactly which accounts a contractor can touch, and keep admin resets in-house.
3. The cost is the outage, not the ransom. M&S's costs were recovery work and lost sales; a decision to switch off early, as Co-op reportedly did, is worth practising.
4. Insurance paid about 76% of the incident cost (100 / 131.3), but not the sales that did not happen.

A password a support agent can reset is a password an attacker can ask for. osec.one logins use one-time codes and Apple/Google sign-in, so your customers have no password to reset. Free to start.

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Sources: UK Parliament, Business and Trade Sub-Committee, M&S evidence session, 8 July 2025; Triumcyber summary of the session; Infosecurity Magazine: M&S chair details the attack; Reuters via StreetInsider: 46-day pause ends; The Register: M&S pegs cleanup costs, 5 Nov 2025; The Register: Click & Collect restored, 11 Aug 2025; ISMS.online: M&S results reconstruction (full-year figures); NCA: four arrested over M&S, Co-op and Harrods; CISA AA23-320A: Scattered Spider.