osec.one case analysis cover: Chick-fil-A 2023, 71,473 app accounts, loyalty points and stored cards in a 57-day credential stuffing run

From 18 December 2022 to 12 February 2023, an automated attack ran against Chick-fil-A's website and app using email and password pairs from somewhere else. It opened 71,473 Chick-fil-A One accounts. Inside were reward points, gift card balances and stored payment methods that could be spent with no further check. Customers complained in public from the first days of January, yet the attack window stayed open for another six weeks.

In June 2026 the same thing happened again on a smaller scale: 13,322 people in three days. This write-up follows the 2023 run from the customer notice and the court file, works out what the login traffic must have looked like, explains why points are such easy money, and gives a control with a starting threshold for each step. It also corrects a figure that gets attached to this case: the $4.4 million Chick-fil-A settlement has nothing to do with it.

Six steps: reused passwords from a third-party source; automated logins on the website and app from 18 Dec 2022 to 12 Feb 2023; account email swapped so alerts stop reaching the owner; food orders on points and $50 charges on stored payment; accounts resold for $2 to $200; cards removed and balances restored, then 13,322 more accounts in 2026
Six steps. The notice blames passwords from a third-party source; everything after the login was the app working as designed.

Timeline, from the notice, the press and the court file

DateWhat happenedSource
18 Dec 2022Automated attack on the website and app begins, using credentials "obtained from a third-party source"Customer notice, 2 Mar 2023
Before Christmas 2022BleepingComputer emails Chick-fil-A about accounts being stolen by credential stuffing and sold onlineBleepingComputer
2 Jan 2023A customer posts that the attacker changed the account email, so notifications stopped arrivingThe Record
4 Jan 2023Chick-fil-A on Twitter: it is investigating, and "this is not due to a compromise of Chick-fil-A Inc.'s internal systems"The Record; complaint ¶12
5 Jan 2023A customer posts that someone used the account's points to order foodThe Record
6 Jan 2023Website alert: "We are investigating suspicious activity on some customer accounts"Complaint ¶13
2 Feb 2023A Georgia customer's account is charged twice, $50 each; her bank refunds the $100Complaint ¶44-45 (allegation)
4 Feb 2023A Missouri customer's account is charged $50; he says support read a script telling him there was no data breach. Refunded 16 FebComplaint ¶35-37 (allegation)
12 Feb 2023End of the attack window; Chick-fil-A determines the accounts were accessedCustomer notice
14 Feb 2023Form email to a customer: changed emails reverted, passwords reset, Chick-fil-A One Card funds frozenComplaint ¶47
2 Mar 2023Notice letters go out; state filings put the total at 71,473 accountsNotice; BleepingComputer
6 Mar 2023Stephens et al. v. Chick-fil-A, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-00964 (N.D. Ga.), filedComplaint
11 Oct 2023Parties report a settlement in principle and ask for a stay to 11 Dec 2023Court document 38
17-19 Jun 2026A second automated attack on the website and appBleepingComputer
13 Jul 2026Chick-fil-A determines account information may have been accessedBleepingComputer
23 Jul-1 Sep 2026Williams v. Chick-fil-A, No. 1:26-cv-04160, filed and then voluntarily dismissed without prejudiceOpenClassActions docket summary

Three gaps matter. The window lasted 57 calendar days. It stayed open for 39 days after the 4 January statement and 41 days after the first customer post cited here. And the formal notice came 57 days after that statement. The statement about internal systems may well have been accurate (the notice later said the same thing), but it answered a different question from the one customers had, which was whether someone was in their account.

How it worked, step by step

1. Passwords from somewhere else

Chick-fil-A's notice says the credentials came from "a third-party source", and it tells customers to pick a password "unique to Chick-fil-A". Neither the notice nor the coverage names the source or says how large the list was. A loyalty app is a good target for this because people treat it as low stakes: a password chosen for a sandwich app is likely to be one they already use elsewhere.

2. Automated logins, website and app both

The notice names both surfaces. That detail matters, because mobile login APIs are often protected less than the web form: no page for a CAPTCHA widget to live on, and traffic that looks like an app rather than a browser. Nothing published says which surface carried most of the traffic, or which login controls existed at the time. The complaint alleges Chick-fil-A had no multi-factor authentication (¶112); that claim was never tested in court.

3. The email address changes

A customer reported this on 2 January, and Chick-fil-A's own 14 February form email confirms it happened: "If we detected an email change for your account, we have reverted your email address." Customer posts cited by The Record say the change hid withdrawal notices. It's the step that turns a one-off theft into a stolen account: the real owner stops hearing about activity, and the reset link now goes to the attacker.

4. Spending points and stored payment

Customers reported food orders on points, money loaded from linked bank accounts, and charges. Both named plaintiffs saw $50 charges, one of them twice in a day. The complaint doesn't say what the $50 bought; a round figure fits a top-up of the Chick-fil-A One Card better than a food order, though that is our reading. Card numbers themselves weren't the prize: the notice says attackers could see only the last four digits. They didn't need more, since the app would charge the stored card for them.

5. Resale

Accounts were sold for $2 to $200, depending on balance, linked payment and reward points, according to a researcher quoted by BleepingComputer and The Record. BleepingComputer saw one Telegram channel where buyers posted pictures of what they had bought with them. So the people doing the logins and the people eating the food need not be the same, and a velocity check on spending has to expect a fresh device for every purchase.

6. The clean-up

Chick-fil-A forced password resets, removed stored cards, froze loaded funds for a while, reverted changed emails, restored balances (with refunds to the original payment method where possible) and added rewards as an apology. It also said it "continues to enhance its security, monitoring, and fraud controls", without saying how. The notice offered no credit monitoring, only a guide to credit reports, fraud alerts and freezes.

What the notice lists, and what each field is for

The right-hand column is our reading of how each field can be misused. The notice doesn't say any of these uses happened.

Field in the noticeUse to an attacker
Name, email addressTargeted phishing that quotes the real account
Membership number, mobile pay number, QR codeIdentifiers tied to in-store use of the account
Masked card number (last four digits)Convincing support staff or the victim that a caller is genuine
Chick-fil-A credit, e.g. e-gift card balanceTells a reseller what to charge for the account, and is itself spendable
Month and day of birthday, phone, address (if saved)Answers to knowledge-based checks, SMS phishing

The numbers, worked through

Chick-fil-A didn't publish how many login attempts it saw. Credential stuffing success rates are usually put somewhere between 0.1% and 2%, the same range used in our PayPal analysis. Here is what 71,473 hits imply over 57 days, assuming an even spread:

Assumed success rateAttempts for 71,473 hitsAttempts a dayAttempts a second
2%3.57 million62,6960.73
1%7.15 million125,3911.45
0.1%71.5 million1,253,91214.5

Worked line for 1%: 71,473 / 0.01 = 7,147,300 attempts; 57 days = 4,924,800 seconds; 7,147,300 / 4,924,800 = 1.45 attempts a second. The hits average 71,473 / 57 = 1,254 accounts a day. Now spread the 1% case across attacking IP addresses, against a limit of 10 attempts a minute per IP:

Attacking IPsAttempts per IP a dayPer IP per minuteTrips 10 a minute?
1125,39187Yes
1012,5398.7No
1001,2540.87No
1,0001250.09No

Ten addresses are enough to stay under that limit, and a rented proxy pool has far more than ten. The per-account view is no better. NIST SP 800-63B-4 caps consecutive failed attempts at 100 per account, a sound rule against guessing, but a stuffing run usually tries one known password per account, so the counter sits at 1. Neither brake sees the attack. What does show up is the aggregate: at a 1% success rate there are 99 failures for every success, and many of the emails on a combo list have no account with you at all.

The per-IP arithmetic is an illustration, since no attacker's IP count has been published. Real traffic also comes in bursts rather than evenly. Our write-up of sign-in rules that count emails and wrong codes covers the same slow, spread-out pattern.

Why loyalty points are such easy money

Published point charts give a sense of what a balance represents. These figures are from 2026 guides, not the December 2022 chart, which was changed in April 2023. The earn rate is 10 points per dollar at the base tier and 13 at Signature:

RewardPointsSpend to earn it at 10 points/$At 13 points/$
Dipping sauce or small side200$20$15
Large waffle fries500$50$38
Nuggets or 2-count strips600$60$46
Full meal2,500$250$192

So a customer who has spent $250 is holding one free meal. That is small for the customer and useful for a thief, and our reading is that the reasons are structural rather than specific to this chain:

• No bank in the loop. Points never appear on a card statement, so there is no issuer fraud model and no chargeback. The Georgia customer's bank refunded her $100 quickly; nobody had that lever for points.
• Balances build up unwatched. Chick-fil-A's points don't expire under the current program, and few people check a rewards balance before they want to use it.
• The spend is instant and can't be recovered. The goods are eaten within the hour. Restoring points costs the company, not the thief.
• The login is the only gate. None of the reports describe a second check before points were spent. Adding one would slow the checkout the app exists to speed up.
• Victims report late and low. A missing free sandwich rarely prompts a call, which delays the signal that something is wrong.

On the reseller's side, 71,473 accounts at the $2 floor comes to $142,946. That is a lower bound under the assumption that every account sold, and we have no evidence that they did. It isn't an estimate of what the attackers made, but it does show why this is worth running for weeks.

2023 and 2026 side by side

Dec 2022-Feb 2023June 2026
Window57 days3 days
People or accounts71,47313,322 (Maine filing)
Average per day1,2544,441
Attempts a second at an assumed 1%1.455.14
From end of attack to the company's determinationSame day (12 Feb)24 days (13 Jul)
Data listedName, email, membership and mobile pay numbers, QR code, last four card digits, credit balance; birthday, phone, address if savedThe same fields, with birth dates, phones and addresses if stored
ResponsePassword resets, cards removed, funds frozen, balances restored, rewards addedLogged out, payment methods removed, balances restored, rewards added, advised to change passwords
LawsuitSettled in principle, terms not publicFiled and voluntarily dismissed within six weeks

The second run was shut down far sooner: 3 days instead of 57, and about 19% of the first count. That is real progress. But it hit at about 3.5 times the daily rate (4,441 / 1,254), and the fields exposed are essentially the same, so a working reused password still opened an account three years on. Faster detection limits the damage from a run; it doesn't change what one good password gets you. We can't tell from public filings what login controls were in place in 2026, or how much the two counts are comparable, since one is accounts and the other is people.

The settlement: what is and isn't known

Some settlement sites and summaries blur two separate Chick-fil-A cases, so here they are apart. Regulators publish figures; private class settlements often don't, and this one didn't.

CaseWhat it was aboutPublished figure
Stephens v. Chick-fil-A (2023)This breach: 71,473 accountsNone. Settlement in principle reported 11 Oct 2023, 219 days after filing, with no amount, no public terms and no claim process we could find. The complaint's $5 million is the threshold for federal jurisdiction, not a settlement figure
Delivery fee class action (2024)Alleged hidden delivery charges, Nov 2019-Apr 2021. Not a data breach$4.4 million: $1.45 million cash and $2.95 million gift cards, up to $29.25 a claimant; claims closed 15 Feb 2024
Williams v. Chick-fil-A (2026)The June 2026 runNone. Voluntarily dismissed 1 Sep 2026, no class certified

For a public number on a loyalty stuffing case, the closest comparison is Dunkin'. New York's Attorney General settled in September 2020 for $650,000 in penalties and costs, over DD Perks attacks from 2015 on, with nearly 20,000 accounts in one five-day sample alone and refunds of stolen DD card funds. That's at most $32.50 an account on the sample ($650,000 / 20,000), and less on the real total, which the AG put at tens of thousands. The AG's complaint was about what happened after the alert: Dunkin' was told of the attacks by a third-party app developer and, according to the AG, did not investigate properly, notify customers or reset passwords. Set that beside our PayPal case, about $57 an account from a regulator. These are what regulators charged elsewhere. Chick-fil-A's own cost, in restored balances, refunds and added rewards, isn't public.

The one per-person number in the 2023 complaint is a damages theory: credit monitoring at about $200 a year for at least five years (¶138). Across the class that would be 71,473 x $200 x 5 = $71.5 million. That is what the plaintiffs' theory implies at its full extent, not what anyone paid, and the fields in the notice didn't include Social Security numbers, which is a weak footing for a five-year monitoring claim.

Controls that break each step

The thresholds below are our suggested starting points for a small or mid-size consumer app, not published standards. Tune them against your own traffic and watch the false positives for a week before you block on them.

StepControlStarting point
Reused passwordCheck against a breached-password list at signup, at password change and at login (NIST SP 800-63B-4 §3.1.1.2 requires a blocklist for new passwords). Better, remove the passwordForce a reset when a login password appears on the list
Automated loginsAlarm on aggregate signals rather than per-IP counts: failed login ratio, and share of attempts for emails with no account. Apply the same rules to the app API as to the web formPage someone at 3 times the 7-day median, per hour
Valid password, new deviceStep-up code before the session can do anything of value. OWASP calls MFA "by far the best defense" against password attacksEvery new device, no exceptions for the app
Email changeCode to the old address, an alert to the old address that can't be turned off, and a hold on spending afterwards24-hour hold on redemptions and top-ups
Redeeming pointsStep-up on the first redemption from a new device. Cap redemptions per device and per account1 redemption per new device in the first 24 hours
Stored-card charge or top-upAsk for the CVV or a passkey on a new device. Cap top-ups1 top-up in 24 hours on a new device; would have flagged the second $50 charge
In-store QR and pay numbersShort-lived codes bound to the session, reissued on password resetRotate in under a minute
ResaleCount accounts per device. Search Telegram and forums for your brand name each weekReview any device touching 3 or more accounts in a day
Support and statementsA script that says what you know, not that nothing happened. Separate "our systems weren't breached" from "your account is safe"Flag the account on the first report and reset it the same day

OWASP also warns that fingerprints can be spoofed and that IP blocks shouldn't be the main defence, so treat each row as one layer. The device count in the resale row is the sort of thing Fingerprint Lite gives a small site without an enterprise contract.

The cheapest fix is the same as in the other stuffing cases: leave no password to replay. A combo list has nothing to try on a sign-in that only takes an email code, Google or Apple. That moves the risk to the inbox rather than removing it (a reused password on the mailbox is still a problem), but an attacker now has to break into a mail account per victim rather than replay a list. If you keep passwords, take the spending rows above first, since they still work after a login has been stolen.

How it differs from Roku and PayPal

Chick-fil-A 2023Roku 2024PayPal 2022
Accounts opened71,473about 591,00034,942
Length57 daystwo waves2-3 days
What the login was worthPoints, gift balances, stored paymentStored card for purchases, resold accountsFull SSN on a tax form
Accounts actually used to spendNot publishedFewer than 400, refundedNo financial information accessed, per PayPal
Resale price reported$2 to $200From $0.50Not the point: the SSN was
Public penalty figureNoneNone in our sources$2 million (NYDFS)

Roku's two waves ended with mandatory two-factor sign-in. PayPal's did too, for US accounts. A food app has a harder trade: every extra step at the counter costs orders, which is probably why the checks belong at the risky moments (new device, email change, first redemption) rather than at every login.

Sign-ins with email codes, Google and Apple: no password to stuff, no OAuth app to set up on your side. Free.

Add passwordless sign-in

Sources

• Chick-fil-A customer notice, 2 March 2023 (California AG copy): https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/2023-03-02%20-%20CFA%20-%20Individual%20Notification%20Template.pdf
• Class action complaint, Stephens et al. v. Chick-fil-A, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-00964-LMM (N.D. Ga., 6 Mar 2023); its allegations are unproven: https://www.classaction.org/media/stephens-et-al-v-chick-fil-a-inc.pdf
• Notice of settlement and joint motion for stay, document 38 (11 Oct 2023): https://www.classaction.org/media/stephens-et-al-v-chick-fil-a-inc-notice-of-settlement.pdf
• BleepingComputer, Chick-fil-A confirms accounts hacked in months-long "automated" attack (2 Mar 2023): https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/chick-fil-a-confirms-accounts-hacked-in-months-long-automated-attack/
• The Record, Chick-fil-A acknowledges customer account abuse but denies compromise of internal systems (9 Jan 2023): https://therecord.media/chick-fil-a-acknowledges-customer-account-abuse-but-denies-compromise-of-internal-systems
• SecurityWeek, Over 71k impacted by credential stuffing attacks on Chick-fil-A accounts (3 Mar 2023): https://www.securityweek.com/over-71k-impacted-by-credential-stuffing-attacks-on-chick-fil-a-accounts/
• BleepingComputer, Chick-fil-A discloses data breach after credential stuffing attacks (22 Jul 2026): https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/chick-fil-a-discloses-data-breach-after-credential-stuffing-attacks/
• BleepingComputer, Chick-fil-A data breach affects more than 13,000 customers (24 Jul 2026): https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/chick-fil-a-data-breach-affects-more-than-13-000-customers/
• OpenClassActions, Chick-fil-A data breach class action (docket summary for the 2026 case; single source): https://openclassactions.com/lawsuits/data-breaches/chick-fil-a-data-breach-class-action-lawsuit.php
• NBC New York, Chick-fil-A's $4.4 million lawsuit settlement (30 Jan 2024; delivery fees, not the breach): https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/national-international/chick-fil-as-4-4-million-lawsuit-settlement-eligible-customers-need-to-file-a-claim-asap/5087710/
• New York Attorney General, Attorney General James Gets Dunkin' to Fill Holes in Security (15 Sep 2020): https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2020/attorney-general-james-gets-dunkin-fill-holes-security-reimburse-hacked-customers
• NIST SP 800-63B-4, §3.1.1.2 and §3.2.2: https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html
• OWASP Credential Stuffing Prevention Cheat Sheet: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Credential_Stuffing_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
• Rivo, Chick-fil-A One rewards program breakdown (earn rates and 2026 point chart): https://www.rivo.io/blog/chick-fil-a-one-rewards
• Loyalty Reward Co, The ultimate guide to Chick-fil-A One (25 Apr 2026; earn rates): https://loyaltyrewardco.com/the-ultimate-guide-to-chick-fil-a-one/
• Fox 9, Chick-fil-A rolls out changes to rewards program (April 2023): https://www.fox9.com/news/chick-fil-a-changes-rewards-program-april-4-2023